Rajasthan Judicial Service Sample Interview Questions and Answers!
PART-A
Q.1. Briefly discuss the applicability of doctrine of severability under Article 13 (1) of the Constitution of India.
Ans. All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void. [Article 13 (1), Constitution]
The State shall not make any such law which snatches or diminishes any of the rights conferred by this Part and every law made in contravention of this clause, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.
An Act is not wholly unenforceable, but such provision is unenforceable which is inconsistent with the fundamental rights. [See: P.N. Kausal vs. Union of India, 1978 (2) SCC 424].
Q.2. Briefly discuss the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 regarding examination of parties by the court at the first hearing of the suit.
Ans. At the first hearing of the suit, the Court—
(i) shall, with a view to elucidating matters in controversy in the suit examine orally such of the parties to the suit appearing in person or present in Court, as it deems fit; and
(ii) may, orally examine and person, able to answer any material question relating to the suit, by whom any party appearing in person or present in Court or his pleader is accompanied. [Order 10 Rule 2(1), C.P.C., 1908]
Q.3. Dilate on admissibility of unregistered and insufficiently stamped document affecting immovable property in evidence for collateral transaction, in context of provisions of Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 39 of Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998.
Ans. Ordinarily such documents are inadmissible in evidence. But—
An unregistered document affecting immovable property and required to be registered may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. [Section 49, Registration Act, 1908]
In case of insufficiently stamped instrument, it may be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty of the amount required to make up such duty.
[Section 39, Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998]
Q.4. “Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability stops it”. Explain in brief.
Ans. According to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability stops it. In other words, after beginning of the period of limitation, it does not stop and after the period of limitation, the right to bring the suit or the application comes to an end.
Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues.
Exceptions:—
(1) The day from which such period of limitation is to be reckoned, shall be excluded; and for filing an appeal etc; the time required in obtaining the copies.
(2) Exclusion of time is cases where leave to sue or appeal asapauper is applied for.
(3) Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court without jurisdiction.
(4) Exclusion of the time of such injunction or order by which filing of the suit or making of the application was stayed.
(5) Exclusion of the period of such notice, where it is necessary to give previous legal notice before filing the suit.
(6) Exclusion of the period during which the defendant is out of India.
(7) On or before the accrual of right for bringing the suit, the person dies.
(8) Effect of fraud or mistake.
(9) Effect of written acknowledgment.
(10) In Government claims, where previous sanction is necessary. [Sections 9 to 18, Limitation Act, 1963]
Q.5. Deliberate on “Rule against the perpetuity” provided under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Ans. “Rule against perpetuity” means that transfer of property cannot be stopped for an indefinite period.
No transfer of property can operate to create an interest which is to take effect after the life time of one or more persons living at the date of such transfer, and the minority of some person who shall be in existence at the expiration of that period, and to whom, if he attains full age, the interest created is to belong. [Section 14, Transfer of Property Act, 1882]
Exceptions:—
(1) If in place of full interest in the property it is merely a case of charge over the property, e.g., lease.
(2) If the transfer of property is for charitable objects and public interests, e.g., trust, wakf, or when it is for religious, welfare or medical and health purpose.
(3) When transfer of property is under an agreement, which does not create vested interest in it.
(4) When transfer in perpetuity is for benefit of public under Section 18.
Q.6. Briefly explain the different modes of dissolution of a firm under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932.
Ans. The following are the modes of dissolution of partnership:—
(1) By mutual consent of the partners,
(2) By happening of events making impossible to carry on the business,
(3) By notice,
(4) By order of Court,
(5) By adjudication of partners as insolvent,
(6) Carrying on business becomes unlawful,
(7) By death of any partner,
(8) By expiry of a fixed term, and
(9) By achieving the object of the firm, etc. [Sections 40 to 44, Indian Partnership Act, 1932]
Q.7. Whether the witness is entitled for permission to be seated while giving evidence in the Court? If so, under what circumstances? How the witnesses produced by the plaintiff and defendant and the witnesses called and examined by the Court are required to be numbered? Indicate with reference to the relevant provisions of General Rules (Civil) 1986.
Ans. Witnesses should normally stand while giving evidence.
But the presiding officer may allow the witness to be seated, while giving evidence, considering valid grounds, such as, (i) infirmity; (ii) old age; (iii) inordinate length of time in giving evidence; or (iv) for any other reason recorded to be in writing.
The witness produced by the plaintiff should be numbered as P.W.I, P.W.2 etc.; and the witness produced by the defendant should be numbered as D.W.I, D.W.2 etc.; and the witness called by the Court should be numbered as C.W.1, C.W.2 etc.; [Rules 85 and 86, General Rules (Civil), 1986]
Q.8. Briefly discuss the power of the Court under Section 89 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Section 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to refer parties to arbitration for settlement of the dispute.
Ans. Where it appears to the Court that there exist elements of a settlement, which may be acceptable to the parties, the Court shall formulate the terms of settlement and give them to the parties for their observations and after receiving the observations of the parties, the Court may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement and refer the same for arbitration. [Section 89 C.P.C., 1908]
According to Section 8, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of dispute, refer the parties to arbitration.
PART-B
Q.9. Elaborate the provisions under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, regarding non-appearance of the parties and consequence of non-appearance.
Ans. The following shall be the consequences of non-appearance or absence of the parties on the date of hearing:—
(i) When neither party appears, the suit shall be dismissed.
(ii) When only the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear, the suit shall be dismissed. But if the defendant had admitted the claim, wholly or partly, the decree shall be passed against him accordingly.
(iii) When the defendant, in spite of due service of summons on him, does not appear, the Court shall proceed against him ex parte. [Order 9, C.P.C., 1908]
Q.10. Discuss the entitlement of a divorced Muslim woman for meher, maintenance and other properties under the provisions of Section 3 of Muslim Women (Protection of Right on Divorce) Act, 1986.
Ans. So far as right of a Muslim woman to claim maintenance is concerned, under the Muslim Law, it is liability of a husband to maintain his wife. But, it is also duty of the wife to perform all her marital legal obligations, i.e., she is chaste, obedient and faithful to her husband.
Wife loses this right if she disobeys her husband’s commands and refuses for intercourse with him without a valid cause.
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan vs. Shah Bano, (1985), the Supreme Court laid down that a divorced Muslim Woman is entitled to get maintenance until she remarries, under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code.
But, after Shah Bano’s case, the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act, 1986, was passed, which provided that a Muslim divorced woman is entitled for reasonable maintenance from her husband for the period of Iddat. After completion of the period of Iddat, she is entitled to get maintenance from her heirs or the Wakf Board.
It is note-worthy that the provisions of Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, are applicable to the Muslim woman only when both the parties agree for it. On the option of the Muslim woman alone, she is not entitled to get maintenance under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code.
But, after passing the judgment by the Supreme Court, in Danial Latifi, etc. vs. Union of India, (2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 740, now, a divorced Muslim Woman has become entitled to get maintenance until she remarries, from her previous husband.
The following relevant concluding lines of this binding judgment are quoted as under:—
(1) A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the Iddat period must be made by the husband within the Iddat period in terms of Section 3(l)(a) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
(2) Liability of a Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to the Iddat period.
(3) A divorced Muslim woman who has not remarried and who is not able to maintain herself after the Iddat period can proceed as provided under Section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death according to Muslim Law from such divorced woman including her children and parents. If any of the relatives being unable to pay maintenance, the Magistrate may direct the State Wakf Board established under the Act to pay such maintenance.
Q.11. Dilate of unpaid seller’s lien as contemplated under Section 47 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. What are the circumstances where under unpaid seller’s lien shall stand terminated?
Ans. The unpaid seller of goods who is in possession of them is entitled to retain ‘ possession of them until payment or tender of the price in the following cases, namely —
(a) where the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit;
(b) where the goods have been sold on credit, but the term of credit has expired;
(c) where the buyer become insolvent.
The seller may excise his right of lien notwithstanding that he is in possession of the goods as agent or bailee for the buyer.
The unpaid seller of the goods losses his lien or his lien is terminated on the goods —
(a) when he delivers the goods to a carrier of other bailee for the purpose of transmission to the buyer without reserving the right of disposal of the goods;
(b) when the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains possession of the goods;
(c) by waiver thereof.
The unpaid seller’s lien on the goods is not terminated by reason only that he has obtained a decree for the price of the goods. [Sections 47 and 49, Sale of Goods Act, 1930]
Q.12. Write short notes on:
(1) Doctrine of lis pendens
(2) Easement of necessity.
Ans. (1) Doctrine at lis pendens:—
When any suit or proceeding (which is not collusive) is pending in any competent Court, in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, then that property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with so as to affect rights of any other party, by any party to the suit or the proceeding, until the case is finally decided by the Court. [Section 52, Transfer of Property Act, 1882]
(2) Easement of Necessity.—
It is such an easement without which dominant immovable property cannot be enjoyed.
When a person transfers or bequeaths his immovable property to another; or a partition is made of the joint property of several persons, then the property goes in possession of another person. When such immovable property cannot at all be enjoyed without exercising easement rights on the other immovable property, then it is called ‘easement of necessity. E.g., Both the parties will have to keep common main gate of the building, otherwise one party will not at all be able to even enter his land or building.
When a person has no path (or way) to go from and come to his own field, except the ‘pagdandi’ of the neighbour’s field, then it will be called ‘easement of necessity’.
‘Easements of necessity’ are such easements, which are absolutely necessary for enjoyment of one’s own property. These types of easements are created by necessity, which are not merely facilities and conveniences. [Section 13, Indian Easements Act, 1882]
PART-C
Q.13. Explain the difference between following:
(i) Return of plaint and Rejection of plaint
(ii) Malice in law and malice in fact.
Ans. (i) Return of plaint and Rejection of plaint:—
At any stage of the suit, it is returned to be presented to the Court in which the suit should have been instituted.
In case the plaint is not presented in the proper Court, it is returned to the plaintiff for presenting it to the proper Court. At any stage of the case, the order to return the plaint shall be written with reasons. [Order 7 Rule 10, C.P.C., 1908]
Whereas, the plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:—
i. where it does not disclose the cause of action;
ii. where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
iii. where the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
iv. where the suit appear from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;
v. where it is not filed in duplicate; and
vi. where the plaintiff fails to present as many copies of the plaint as there are defendants along with requisite fee for service of summons on the defendants in compliance of the order of the Court according to Order 7, Rule 9. [Order 7 Rule 11, C.P.C., 1908]
(ii) Malice in law and Malice in fact:—
Ordinarily the meaning of malice is wrongful intention.
Malice in law is also known as the constructive malice. From the conduct of a person such malice is inferred. Doing of any legal proceeding on invalid and wrong grounds comes within the ambit of malice in law. If any person does any act against the law then he cannot take the defence that he had no wrongful intention. Such malice is not excused by law.
Whereas malice in fact is also called the actual notice. In it, there is direct wrongful intention or malicious object of the person, which is expressed by his acts or omissions and external circumstances. In it, the accused person or a certain party does some act or omission by mala fide object, wrongful intention or criminal mentality.
Q.14. “Arbitrariness is antithesis to Article 14 of the Constitution of India”, Elaborate.
Ans. It has been enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the territory of India.
Its meaning is that no person is above the law and he will be within the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts, irrespective of his position or designation. No person shall be denied to equal legal protection before the law.
“Equal protection of law” has been taken from the Constitution of U.S.A., according to which, every person in similar circumstances shall be equally dealt with and while giving protection to any person, there shall not be any discrimination.
It is undisputed that in India, there is “Rule of law” whose main principle is that here the law is supreme and the absence of arbitrariness.
In Jaisingh Bhai vs. The Union of India, it has been held by the Supreme Court of India that it is the first essential ingredient of the Rule of law that there is absence of arbitrariness. It is the basis of our democratic system.
Prof. Diecy makes this doctrine more clear. According to him, whether he is Prime Minister or Police Constable, everyone is amenable to the jurisdiction of one and the same ordinary Court. Further, none can be made to suffer in person, property or reputation, except it is proved in ordinary Courts of law and that too by ordinary legal procedure and manner, considering that all persons are equal before law. Reasonable opportunity of hearing must be given to the affected person.
The State shall not deny to any person equality before law or the equal protection of law within the territory of India. There shall be no discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and not by any other mode or arbitrariness.
Conclusively, in a welfare, developing and democratic State like India, experience shows that our judiciary is very well applying the principles of rule of law in its day to day practice by attacking arbitrariness of the legislature, the executive and other authorities and defending the genuine causes of public at large as guardian of the Constitution.
Q.15. Elaborately discuss the remedies falling in the realm of civil law, provided under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to those women who have been in domestic relationship with the respondent as defined under provisions of Section 2 (q) of the said Act.
Ans. (1) Protection Orders.—
The Court may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from—
(a) committing any act of domestic violence;
(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;
(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;
(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;
(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Court;
(f) causing violence to the dependents, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;
(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.
(2) Residence Orders—
The Court may, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a residence order—
(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared household;
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relative from entering any portion of the shared household in which the aggrieved person resides;
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Court; or
(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same.
While making an order, the Court may impose on the respondent obligations relating to the discharge of rent and other payments, having regard to the financial needs and resources of the parties.
The Court may direct the respondent to return to the possession of the aggrieved person her stridhan or any other property or valuable security to which she is entitled to.
(3) Monetary Reliefs.—
The Court may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child of the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence and such relief may include, but not limited to the.—
(a) loss of earnings;
(b) medical expenses;
(c) loss caused due to the destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of the aggrieved person; and
(d) maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children.
(4) Custody Orders—
The Court may, at any stage of hearing of the application for protection order or for any other relief under this Act grant temporary custody of any child or children to the aggrieved person making an application on her behalf and specify, if necessary, the arrangements for visit of such child or children by the respondent.
(5) Compensation Orders—
The Court may on an application being made by the aggrieved person, pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by that respondent.
(6) The Court may pass an interim or ex parte order as he deems just and proper. [Sections 17 to 23, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005]
Q.16. Elaborately discuss the principles guiding the discretion of the Court in granting decree for specific performance of the contract.
Ans. Specific performance of any contract may, in the-discretion of the Court, be enforced—
(a) where there exists no standard for ascertaining actual damage caused by the nonperformance of the act agreed to be done. E.g., contract relating to sale and purchase of rare antiques.
(b) where the compensation in money for non-performance of the act agreed would not afford adequate relief. E.g., contract relating to sale and purchase of a rare painting of a world-wide famous painter.
(c) where a breach of contract to transfer immovable property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation in money. E.g., in spite of the fact that although the seller had already received the full price of a building from the purchaser, yet, on the ascertained date, the seller is refusing to execute and register the sale-deed and hand over possession of that building to the purchaser.
(d) where it becomes impossible to get the compensation relating to a contract. E.g., the person liable to pay the compensation becomes insolvent. [Section 10, Specific Relief Act, 1963]
Q.17. Discuss the rules governing the devolution of property of Hindu male dying intestate among heirs in Class I and II of the Schedule appended to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
Class I
Son; daughter; widow; mother; son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a predeceased son; son of a pre-deceased daughter; daughter of a pre-deceased daughter; widow of a pre-deceased son; son of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; daughter of a pre-deceased son of a pre-deceased son; widow of a pre-deceased son of a predeceased son.
Class II
I. Father.
II. (1) Son’s daughter’s son, (2) son’s daughter’s daughter, (3) brother, (4) sister.
III. (1) Daughter’s son’s son, (2) daughter’s son’s daughter, (3) daughter’s daughter’s son, (4) daughter’s daughter’s daughter.
IV. (1) Brother’s son, (2) sister’s son, (3) brother’s daughter, (4) sister’s daughter.
V. Father’s father; father’s mother.
VI. Father’s widow; brother’s widow.
VII. Father’s brother; father’s sister.
VIII. Mother’s father; mother’s mother.
IX. Mother’s brother; mother’s sister. [Schedule, Hindu Succession Act, 1956]
Ans. Under Sections 8 to 13 and Schedule, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, rules relating to the succession of a Hindu intestate male, have been provided.
The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve as under:—
(a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule;
(b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in Class II of the Schedule;
(c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased; and
(d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased. [Section 8] Among the heirs specified in the schedule, those in Class I shall take simultaneously and to the exclusion of all other heirs; those in the first entry in Class II shall be preferred to those in the second entry; those in the second entry shall be preferred to those in the third entry; and so on in succession. [Section 9]
The property amongst heirs in Class I of the Schedule shall be divided according to following rules:
Rule 1—The intestate’s widow, or if there are more widows than one, all the widows together, shall take one share.
Rule 2—The surviving sons and daughters and the mother of the intestate shall each take one share.
Rule 3—The heirs in the branch of each pre-deceased son or each pre-deceased daughter of the intestate shall take between them one share.
Rule 4—The distribution of the share referred to in Rule 3—
(i) among the heirs in the branch of the pre-deceased son shall be so made that his widow (or widows together) and the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions; and the branch of his pre-deceased sons gets the same portion;
(ii) among the heirs in the branch of the pre-deceased daughter shall be so made that the surviving sons and daughters get equal portions. [Section 10]
The property of an intestate shall be divided between the heirs specified in any one entry in Class II of the Schedule so that they share equally. [Section 11]
The order of succession among agnates or cognates shall be determined in accordance with the rules of preference laid down hereunder:
Rule 1—Of two heirs, the one who has fewer or no degrees of ascent is preferred.
Rule 2—Where the number of degrees of ascent is the same or none, that heir is preferred who has fewer or no degrees of descent.
Rule 3—Where neither heirs is entitled to be preferred to the other under Rule 1 or Rule 2 they take simultaneously. [Section 12]
Computation of degrees is done under Section 13. [Sections 6 to 13 and Schedule, Hindu Succession Act, 1956]
Q.18. “Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by coercion or undue influence or fraud or misrepresentation or mistake”. Discuss with reference to provisions of Sections 14 to 22 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
Ans. Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation or mistake.
When for an agreement, consent is caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud or misrepresentation, then the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.
When both the parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void.
A contract is not voidable because it was caused by a mistake as to any law in force in India; but a mistake as to a law not in force in India has the same effect as a mistake of fact.
A contract is not voidable merely because it was caused by one of the parties to it being under a mistake as to a matter of fact. [Sections 14 to 22, Indian Contract Act, 1872]
PART-D
Q.19. Frame the issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties noticed below and write the judgment.
M/s. B.G. & Company, Nokha, a partnership firm, entered into an agreement with M/s. P. Patel & Company, Unjha, to purchase 200 bags of Cumin for consideration of Rs.3,20,000/-. However, before the actual trans-shipment of the goods, M/s. S. Sethia & Company, Bikaner, purchased the said goods from M/s. B.G. & Company after full payment of the value of the goods. Accordingly, the original vendor M/s. P. Patel & Company at Unjha was instructed to direct the goods for delivery to M/s. S. Sethia & Company. The goods were dispatched from Unjha to Bikaner through North Western Railways. The goods were not delivered by the Railways to M/s. S. Sethia & Company within reasonable time and therefore, its representative contacted concerned authority of Railways at Bikaner time and again, however, the concerned authority informed that the goods had not reached to its destination so far. Later, after a lapse of about one month, the vendee M/s. S. Sethia & Company was informed about the arrival of the goods at the Railway Station, Bikaner. The goods were brought in a wagon different than a wagon wherein the same were initially trans-shipped. The vendee M/s. S. Sethia & Company found that the goods were in the highly damaged condition and therefore, it claimed for open delivery. The Railways claimed demurrage, which was duly paid by the said firm. During the course of open delivery, it was found that the goods were damaged to such an extent that the same were not fit for human consumption. The assessment of the damage was made by the Railway authorities and the loss suffered was quantified at Rs.1,60,000/-. The vendee M/s. S. Sethia & Company after serving a notice upon the
Railway authorities under Section 80 CPC read with Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989, filed a suit before the District Judge, Bikaner claiming compensation for the damage caused to the goods and interest thereon, a sum of Rs.1,60,000/- and Rs.8,000/- respectively.
The suit was contested by the Railways by filing a written statement thereto wherein, while trans-shipment of the goods from Unjha to Bikaner was accepted, however, the ownership of the goods of the plaintiff M/s. S. Sethia & Company was denied. It was averred that the train wherein the goods were initially loaded met with an accident between the station Unjha to Abu Road and consequently, the wagon wherein the goods were loaded was badly damaged and therefore, later same were re-loaded in another wagon, which reached the destination after a lapse of about one month. It was also averred that the accident did not occur on account of negligence on the part of the Railway employees and it being an act of God, the Railways cannot be held liable for damages. Regarding the damage assessment report, the stand of the Railways was that the same having been prepared without prejudice to the interest of Railways, is not admissible in evidence. The Railways raised an objection that since the plaintiff has no right, title or interest in the disputed goods and therefore, it has no locus standi to maintain the suit. Though, the receipt of the notice alleged to have been sent by the plaintiff was not denied, it was averred on behalf of the Railways that the notice was not served in conformity with the provisions of Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989 and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed on this count alone. The Railways also questioned the maintainability of the suit on the ground that by virtue of Section 15 of Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, no Court or other authority have or is entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in respect of claim for compensation for damages and therefore, the suit being barred by law, deserves to be dismissed.
Ans. Issues
(1) Whether the goods were damaged to such an extent that the same were not fit for human consumption? (Plaintiff)
(2) Whether due to the defendant’s default or negligence, he is liable to compensate the plaintiff for damage of the goods? (Plaintiff)
(3) Whether the notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendant was according to law? (Plaintiff)
(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get from the defendant the compensation for the damage of the goods amounting to Rs.1,60,000/- and interest thereon Rs.8,000/-? (Plaintiff)
(5) Whether since the plaintiff has right, title and interest in the disputed goods, has right to file the suit? (Plaintiff)
(6) Whether due to the act of God, the goods were damaged? (Defendant)
(7) Whether the damage assessment report is inadmissible in evidence? (Defendant)
(8) Whether under Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, since the jurisdiction of this Court is barred, this suit is liable to be dismissed? (Defendant)
(9) Relief.
Court of the District Judge, Bikaner (Raj.)
Presiding Officer A.B.C., R.H.J.S.
Civil Original Case No. 951/2015.
M/s. S. Sethia & Company, Gajner Road, Bikaner (Raj.) through…………..Plaintiff
vs.
The General Manager, North Western Railway……………..Defendant
Suit for compensation for the damage of goods.
Present:—
Shri……………., Counsel for the plaintiff.
Shri……………, Counsel for the defendant,
Judgment
Date: 10th October, 2015.
The plaintiff has filed this suit against the defendant for compensation for the damage of goods amounting to Rs.1,60,000/- and interest thereon Rs.8,000/-. Briefly stated, the pleadings of the plaint are that M/s. B.G. & Company, Nokha, a partnership firm, entered into an agreement with M/s. P. Patel & Company, Unjha, to purchase 200 bags of Cumin for consideration of Rs.3,20,000/-. However, before the actual transshipment of the goods, the plaintiff company purchased the said goods from M/s. B.G. & Company after full payment of the value of the goods.
Accordingly, the original vendor M/s. P. Patel & Company at Unjha was instructed to direct the goods for delivery to the plaintiff company. The goods were dispatched from Unjha to Bikaner through North Western Railways. The goods were not delivered by the Railways to the plaintiff company within reasonable time. Later, after a lapse of about one month, the vendee plaintiff company was informed about of the arrival of the goods at the Railway Station, Bikaner.
The vendee plaintiff company found that the goods were in the highly damaged condition and therefore, it claimed for open delivery. The Railways claimed demurrage, which was duly paid by the said firm. During the course of open delivery, it was found that the goods were damaged to such an extent that the same were not fit for human consumption. The assessment of the damage was made by the Railway authorities and the loss suffered was quantified at Rs.1,60,000/-. A notice under Section 80, C.P.C., 1908 read with Section 106, Railways Act, 1989 was given by the plaintiff company to the defendant.
Thereafter, while claiming Rs.1,60,000/- for compensation for the damage of goods and interest thereon Rs.8,000/-, this suit has been filed in this Court by the plaintiff.
The defendant filed the written statement, wherein he pleaded that the plaintiff company is not the owner of the disputed goods; and since the plaintiff company has no right, title and interest in the goods, it is not entitled to bring this suit. During transportation of the goods, these goods were damaged, which was an Act of God, and there was not any default or negligence on the part of the employees of the defendant. Therefore, the defendant is not liable to give compensation for damage of the goods.
Notice was not sent to the defendant by the plaintiff according to Section 106, Railway Act, 1989; and by virtue of Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, no Court is entitled to exercise any jurisdiction in respect of claim for compensation for damages and therefore, the suit being barred, deserves to be dismissed. Regarding the damage assessment report, the stand of the Railways was that the same having been prepared without prejudice to the interest of Railways, is not admissible in evidence.
Therefore, the suit being not maintainable and barred by law, it be dismissed.
On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:—
(1) Whether the goods were damaged to such an extent that the same were not fit for human consumption? (Plaintiff)
(2) Whether due to the defendant’s default or negligence, he is liable to compensate the plaintiff for damage of the goods? (Plaintiff)
(3) Whether the notice sent by the plaintiff to the defendant was according to law? (Plaintiff)
(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get from the defendant the compensation for the damage of the goods amounting to Rs.1,60,000/- and interest thereon Rs.8,000/-? (Plaintiff)
(5) Whether since the plaintiff has right, title and interest in the disputed goods, it has right to file the suit? (Plaintiff)
(6) Whether due to the act of God, the goods were damaged? (Defendant)
(7) Whether the damage assessment report is inadmissible in evidence? (Defendant)
(8) Whether under Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, since the jurisdiction of this Court is barred, this suit is liable to be dismissed? (Defendant)
(9) Relief.
According to Order 14 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908, when the Court is of the opinion that the case may be disposed of on an issue of law only, if that issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Court, or a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, then the Court may settle such issue first in the form of a preliminary issue.
Therefore, this issue No. 8 is being settled first in the form of a preliminary issue.
Issue No. 8:—
According to Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, the jurisdiction of the Courts has been barred in respect of the claims for compensation for damage of goods entrusted to the Railway administration for carriage by railway.
Therefore, this issue is decided in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
Order:
Since there is a bar of jurisdiction for this Court to try such suit, this suit is dismissed. Both the parties shall bear their own costs of this suit.
Decree-sheet be prepared accordingly.
Sd/- A.B.C.
District Judge, Bikaner.
Judgment signed and pronounced in the open Court, today the 10th October, 2015. Seal of the Court. Sd/- A.B.C
District Judge, Bikaner.